Reference-dependent preferences and the transmission of monetary policy by Gaffeo, Edoardo et al.
Reference-dependent Preferences and the Transmission of
Monetary Policy
Edoardo Ga¤eoy Ivan Petrellaz Damjan Pfajfarx Emiliano Santoro{
October 6, 2010
Abstract
This paper proposes a novel explanation of the vast empirical evidence showing that
output and prices react asymmetrically to monetary policy innovations over contractions
and expansions in the business cycle. We use VAR techniques to show that monetary
policy exerts stronger e¤ects on the U.S. GDP during contractionary phases, as compared
to expansionary ones. As to prices, their response is not statistically di¤erent across di¤erent
cyclical stages. We show that these facts are consistent with a New Neoclassical Synthesis
model based on the assumption that households utility partly depends on deviations of
their consumption from a reference level below which aversion to loss is displayed. In line
with the theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), losses in consumption utility
loom larger than gains. This implies state-dependent degrees of real rigidity and elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption that generate competing e¤ects on the responses
of output and ination following a monetary innovation. The key predictions of the model
are in line with the data. We then explore the state-dependent trade-o¤ between ination
and output stabilization that naturally arises in this context. Greater elasticity of ination
to real activity during expansionary stages of the cycle promotes a stronger degree of policy
activism in the response to the expected rate of ination under discretion, compared to what
is otherwise prescribed during contractions.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work by Mitchell (1927), considerable e¤ort has been devoted to the study
of asymmetries in macroeconomic time series. Graham (1930), Keynes (1936) and Friedman
and Schwartz (1963) have then stimulated a vast debate on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary
policy. Widespread empirical evidence has been produced in support of the view that monetary
policy exerts asymmetric e¤ects on output and prices with respect to the economic conditions
as well as the size and direction of the policy action.1 Such e¤ects have important implications
not only for the way we think about the macroeconomy, but also for the conduct of economic
policy.
In this paper we focus on asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy over contrac-
tionary and expansionary phases of the business cycle. Contractions (expansions) are intended
as periods in which the cycle moves from its peak (trough) to the trough (peak). In this respect,
two major regularities have emerged (see, e.g., Weise, 1999). On the one hand, monetary policy
innovations have greater impact on output during negative stages of the cycles. On the other
hand, changes in the monetary policy stance exert stronger e¤ects on prices during expansion-
ary phases. These facts motivate our study. We put forward a novel potential explanation of
the cyclical asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy, based on households display-
ing reference-dependent preferences in consumption. We show how embedding prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in a popular macroeconomic framework can robustly account
for the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy on real activity and prices.
Reference-dependent preferences have received strong attention in the literature on asset
pricing. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) have successfully
employed prospect theory to explain the behavior of asset returns and resolve a number of
quantitative asset pricing puzzles. A key feature of the model of Barberis, Huang, and Santos
(2001) is that households care about gains and losses in nancial wealth. By contrast, Koszegi
and Rabin (2009) assume that households care about gains and losses in consumption. This
assumption is empirically supported by Yogo (2008) and Rosenblatt-Wisch (2008).
The novelty of this paper is to embed reference-dependent utility in a dynamic general equi-
librium framework. We set aside asset pricing implications and focus on the transmission of
monetary policy on output and ination. Our modeling strategy consists of assuming that con-
sumersutility partly depends on the deviation of their current consumption from the previous
periods average consumption in the economy, which represents the habit reference level below
which loss-aversion is displayed. In line with the theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991), losses in consumption utility resonate more than
gains.
Two key mechanisms are identied. First, during contractions changes in the real rate of
interest exert stronger impact on output through an increase in the elasticity of intertemporal
1Three main regularities have emerged: (i) money does a¤ect output strongly when monetary policy is re-
strictive and raises ination when it is expansive; (ii) the e¤ects of money on output is greater during the
contractionary phases of business cycles and their impact on ination is greater during expansionary phases; (iii)
if prices are sticky, then only negative shocks a¤ect output. Here are some noteworthy contributions: Falk (1986),
Cover (1992), Thoma (1994), Karras (1996), Acemoglu and Scott (1997), Weise (1999), Senda (2001), Ravn and
Sola (2004), Peersman and Smets (2005), Lo and Piger (2005).
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substitution between current and future consumption. This property of the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution has been widely explored in the literature on asset pricing (see, e.g.,
Yogo, 2008). Second, accounting for reference-dependent preferences in a general equilibrium
setting implies a state-dependent marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
that can be related to rmsreal marginal cost, so that equilibrium in the labor market holds.
As a direct implication, the pass-through of real activity to prices depends on the level of con-
sumption relative to its reference level and is lower during contractionary states as opposed to
expansionary ones. Both features of the model are compatible with output being more adversely
a¤ected by monetary policy innovations during contractionary phases. Concurrently, ination
responses to monetary innovations are somewhat insulated by the higher responsiveness of real
activity during negative growth cycles through an increased degree of real rigidity in the labor
market.
We explore the state-dependent trade-o¤that naturally arises in this context. Optimal policy
under discretion imposes a stronger degree of reactiveness to the expected rate of ination in the
expansionary state as compared to the contractionary one. Consequently, in the expansionary
state monetary policy can reach a policy frontier which is otherwise unattainable under the
contractionary one. On the one hand, assuming an aggressive monetary stance on ination
during contractions, i.e. a policy that aims at completely o¤setting uctuations in ination,
incurs into relatively higher costs in terms of output volatility. On the other hand, attaching
increasing importance to output volatility gradually leads to similar costs in terms of ination
volatility across di¤erent states. Most importantly, reducing ination variability by the same
amount and from the same level in the two cyclical stages entails higher costs in terms of output
variability during negative growth cycles.
It is important to recall that the macroeconomic literature has proposed a variety of mecha-
nisms acting from both the supply and the demand side of the economy and capable to account
for di¤erent types of asymmetry.2 Among others, Lo and Piger (2005) and Peersman and Smets
(2005) suggest that the balance-sheet channel is consistent with larger e¤ects of monetary policy
on output during unfavorable growth states. However, this mechanism implies an analogous
amplication (attenuation) of monetary policy innovations on both prices and real activity dur-
ing contractionary (expansionary) phases, thus contradicting the empirical evidence. Di¤erent
potential factors have also been proposed to account for other sources of asymmetry in the mon-
etary transmission, such as non-linearities in investment (Bertola and Caballero, 1994), patterns
of entry and exit from a given market under uncertainty about prot perspectives (Dixit, 1989),
nominal rigidities in the labor and goods market (Ball and Mankiw, 1995), learning and in-
formation aggregation (Chalkley and Lee, 1998), convex aggregate supply (Devereux and Siu,
2007).3 However, a mechanism capable to account for the joint reaction of output and prices
to a monetary policy innovation over di¤erent stages of the business cycle still has to emerge.
We provide an alternative based on behavioral mechanisms that have found wide empirical and
experimental support in the literature (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz, 1997).
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 reports some empirical evidence
2For a survey of these approaches see Dufrenot, Mignon, and Peguin-Feissolle (2004).
3See Florio (2004) for a review of the literature.
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from a reduced form state-dependent VAR on the cyclical transmission of monetary policy;
Section 3 details the theoretical framework we propose to account for these facts; Section 4
details the qualitative and quantitative features of the framework under scrutiny and provides
intuition on the key mechanisms generating asymmetry in the responses of output and prices
over di¤erent cyclical phases; Section 5 discusses the main policy implications of allowing for
loss-averse preferences over consumption in our general equilibrium setting; the last section
concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
McKay and Reis (2008) have recently revived the interest in asymmetric uctuations over dif-
ferent stages of the cycle. These are to be intended as phases of expansion and contraction in
economic activity and are referred to as growth cycles, in contrast with the "classical cycles
(Zarnowitz, 1992). The aim of this section is to document the e¤ects of monetary policy on
output and prices over positive and negative growth cycles. Two main results are highlighted:
(i) rst, the response of output is greater during contractionary phases and signicantly smaller
during expansionary ones; (ii) second, despite the amplication of output responses during neg-
ative growth cycles, prices are invariantly a¤ected by a monetary policy innovation over di¤erent
stages of the cycle. Asymmetries in the responses of either output or prices (primarily the for-
mer) to monetary policy innovations have widely been documented in the existing literature,
although the analysis of their joint behavior has been somewhat disregarded.4
Since Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992), it has become common practice to im-
plement vector autoregression (VAR) methods to identify and measure the e¤ects of monetary
policy innovations on macroeconomic variables. The monetary policy shock is identied as the
unforecasted innovation of the policy instrument (for a survey, see Christiano et al., 1999). We
follow this literature and employ a piecewise-linear structural VAR, distinguishing between con-
tractionary and expansionary phases of the business cycle. We estimate the following monthly
VAR model for the U.S. economy:
Yt = A (L)Yt 1 + [B (L)Yt 1] I + "Yt ; (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables, "Yt is a vector of error terms that are assumed
to be white noise and I =0 when the economy is expanding, while I =1 when the economy is
in a contractionary phase of the cycle. We characterize contractions (expansions) as periods in
which the output gap moves its peak (trough) to the trough (peak). The vector Yt includes the
industrial production index (IPI), the consumer price index (CPI), commodities prices and the
federal funds rate. All variables but the policy rate are in natural logarithms.5
A rst problem in this type of empirical investigation relates to the determination of an
indicator of contractions/expansions. We consider the month-to-month rate of growth of the
CBO output gap series, i.e. the percentage deviation of real GDP from the Congressional Budget
O¢ ce potential output. To identify growth cycles, we apply a four months one-sided MA lter
4Weise (1999) is a noteworthy exception.
5Data have been collected from the St. Louis Fed Economic Database, FRED R.
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to the output gap series, so as to avoid the inclusion of those switches that do not last more
than a quarter.6 Figure 1 reports the contraction bands consistent with our approach against
the NBER recession bands and the output-gap series. Clearly, all NBER recession episodes fall
within the contractionary phases implied by the output gap indicator.
Insert Figure 1 here
The VAR features a constant, a time trend and six lags, and is estimated over the time
period 1955:M1-2008:M12.7 We generate impulse responses of the variables in Yt to a monetary
policy shock, which is identied by imposing a triangular orthogonalization. Figure 2 displays
impulse responses to a 1% interest rate shock under I =0 and I =1.8 In both cases, a monetary
policy shock exerts a clear contractionary e¤ect on output. Overall, the response of prices is
dominated by a pronounced price-puzzle e¤ect.9 In spite of the similarity in the direction of the
responses, some di¤erences are clear. On the one hand, output is more adversely a¤ected during
contractionary phases. Specically, the contractionary e¤ect on output is more than twice as
large as that appreciated in expansions. On the other hand, prices appear less responsive during
contractionary episodes. Only a mild price-puzzle e¤ect can be appreciated in this case, whereas
the positive response is somewhat more sizeable during a positive growth cycle. However, the
di¤erence in price responses seems to be less evident than that observed for output.
Insert Figure 2 here
To assess the validity of the state-dependent VAR we run equation-by-equation F-tests in
the reduced form VAR (1). This amounts to test the signicance of the coe¢ cient associated
with the dummy variable. These F-tests yield p-values of 0.0514 for the industrial production
index equation, 0.0016 for the price equation, 0.0028 for the commodity prices equation, and
0.0000 for the federal funds rate equation.
It must be stressed that the F-tests on the linear reduced-form VAR do not map on a one-
to-one basis into a test on the corresponding impulse-response functions, as these are non-linear
combinations of the estimated coe¢ cients in the VAR. To assess the signicance of cyclical-
dependence in the impulse-response functions we construct a test on the maximum di¤erence,
in absolute value, between the impulse responses of each variable in the cycle-dependent VAR
6Taking a one-sided lter allows us to avoid simultaneity problems that potentially arise when data are splitted
in accordance with the current state of the cycle. Results are robust to alternative indicator functions that select
data based on previous periods cyclical phase. Our methodology is analogous to that employed by McKay and
Reis (2008). They primarily rely on the algorithm developed by Bry and Boschan (1971) to date turning points
in the cycle.
7The choice of this lag specication is consistent with the Schwarz information criterion (BIC). However,
results are robust to alternative lag specications.
8The gure also displays the 90% condence bands obtained through the other percentile bootstrap method
(Hall, 1992).
9As rst noted by Sims (1992), empirical studies employing structural VARs generally detect positive and
signicant (on impact) responses of the price level to a monetary policy shock. Conventional dynamic general
equilibrium frameworks cannot replicate such puzzling evidence. Sims (1992) and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz
(2005) suggest that this fact could be due to an omitted variables bias. By contrast, Barth and Ramey (2000)
point to the cost channel as a possible "structural" explanation of this nding. In this section we focus on
asymmetries in the response of prices to monetary innovations over di¤erent phases of the cycle, regardless of the
direction of the response.
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and the linear VAR.10 This test complements the F-tests on the linear VAR equations. The
p-values from this test are reported in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Di¤erences in impulse responses over di¤erent cyclical phases (p-values)
Variable
Cyclical Phases IPI CPI Commodity Prices Fed Funds Rate
Expansions 0.0140 0.1660 0.0050 0.0040
Contractions 0.6600 0.8360 0.7650 0.0770
We cannot reject the null hypothesis of a di¤erent response (with respect to the linear VAR)
for contractions in the cycle and each of the variables included in the VAR, while we do re-
ject the null hypothesis for expansionary episodes, for all variables but the CPI. These results
support a statistically signicant di¤erence in output responses to a monetary shock between
contractionary and expansionary episodes, with output being more sensitive to interest rate
innovations during economic slowdowns. By contrast, prices are less responsive to contractions
in aggregate demand during negative growth cycles. As remarked in Section 1, this evidence
may be compatible with a number of mechanisms, such as a convex aggregate supply func-
tion. In the remainder of the paper we show how a model of reference-dependent preferences
in consumption can provide a novel and alternative explanation of the observed asymmetries.
Whereas this mechanism has drawn considerable attention in literature on asset pricing, which
has been mainly aimed at reconciling the consumption-based CAPM with the empirical behav-
ior of asset returns, little e¤ort has been made to explore its relevance in the macroeconomic
literature. Some applications to price setting (Heidhues and Koszegi, 2005) and consumption
theory (Koszegi and Rabin, 2009) have recently been proposed. However, to the best of our
knowledge, we provide the rst contribution exploring the role of loss-aversion in consumption
utility within a dynamic general equilibrium setting.
3 A Model of Reference-dependent Consumption Choices
This section sets out the structure of the model we put forward to explain the empirical evi-
dence documented in the previous section. The supply side is populated by monopolistically
competitive rms producing intermediate goods and a perfectly competitive sector of produc-
tion that sells a composite of consumption goods. As to the demand side, there is a continuum
of atomistic consumers, indexed by i 2 [0; 1].
3.1 Demand Side
Households have preferences dened over leisure (1   Nit), consumption (Cit) and gains and
losses in consumption relative to its reference level (Xit). They maximize the expected present
10We resort to simulation methods for inference. Using a bootstrap procedure, we calculate the distribution of
the test statistics under the assumption that there is no cycle-dependence (for a similar test, see also Olivei and
Tenreyro, 2007).
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discounted value of their utility:
Wit = Et
1X
s=0
s
"
U (Cit+s; Xit+s)  
N1+it+s
1 + 
#
;  > 0; (2)
where  is the intertemporal discount factor and  is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and Yogo (2008), we consider a general class of
reference-dependent preferences:11
U (C;X) = V (C) + (1  )  (V (C)  V (X)) ;  2 [0; 1] ; (3)
where V (C) is a neoclassical utility function: this is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing, and concave for all C > 0.  () is a gain-loss function (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), that is, utility derived from the deviation of consumption utility V (C) from
its reference level, V (X).12 Preferences that depend on a reference level of consumption have
psychological foundations in hedonic adaptation (see Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999).13
In line with Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999), we assume that  () satises some
properties. Specically: (i)  (Z) is continuous for all Z 0s, twice di¤erentiable for Z 6= 0 and
 (0) = 0; (ii)  (Z) is strictly increasing; (iii) if 0 < Z < Z
0
, then  (Z) + 

 Z 0

<  (Z) +


 Z 0

; (iv)

0
 (0)

0
+(0)
> 1, where 
0
+ (0) = limZ!0 
0
(jZj) and 0  (0) = limZ!0 
0
(  jZj); (v)

00
(Z)  0 for Z > 0 and 00 (Z)  0 for Z < 0. Properties (i) and (ii) imply monotonicity,
i.e. utility is strictly increasing in the magnitude of the gain. Loss-aversion, i.e. the impact
of a loss is greater than that of an equally sized gain, is captured by (iii) for small stakes and
(iv) for large stakes. These properties imply that when the representative consumer is in a bad
state, she will become more sensitive to the relative consumption level than when she is in a
good state. Finally, (v) is referred to as diminishing sensitivity, i.e. the marginal e¤ect of a gain
or a loss diminishes with its magnitude. To account for these properties we use an exponential
gain-loss utility (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005):
 (Z) =
8>><>>:
1 exp( Z)
 i¤ Z  0
  [1 exp(


Z)]
 otherwise
;   0;  > 1; (4)
where  determines the degree of diminishing sensitivity and  is a parameter that indexes the
degree of loss-aversion. Note that for  = 0 we obtain a linear gain-loss function. Otherwise,
(4) retains the property to be smooth at the reference point.14
As to the reference consumption level, we assume that consumers evaluate the distance
between consumption utility and a function of the average consumption in the previous period:
11For the time being, and without loss of generality, we describe reference-dependent preferences by reporting
variables without subscripts.
12 In the remainder we will assume, without loss of generality, logarithmic consumption utility.
13Koszegi and Rabin (2009) have envisaged a model of reference-dependent consumption choices. However,
their focus is on the role of bad news about future consumption vs. good ones in the determination of current
consumption choices. Other applications of this model, such as Yogo (2008), are mainly focused on asset pricing.
14This property is particularly useful in the perspective of linearizing the model economy.
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Xit = C

t 1, where  2 [0; 1] indexes the importance of external habit formation.15 Therefore
we follow Yogo (2008), embedding habit formation in a reference-dependent model.16 External
habit formation in consumption is usually introduced to account for the empirical persistence
in the consumption process (Smets and Wouters, 2007). Unlike internal habit formation, this
mechanism implies that households fail to internalize the externality of their own consumption
on the utility of other households.
To gain further intuition on the structure of reference-dependent preferences over consump-
tion, Figure 3 plots (4) and its rst order derivative for di¤erent values of Z (x-axis) and  (we
set  = 1). As predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion reects the widely
observed behavior that agents are more sensitive to losses than gains, resulting in a gain-loss
function that is steeper in the rst case (see the left-hand panel of Figure 3).
Insert Figure 3 here
As to the intertemporal budget constraint, we assume that the ith consumer, whose labor
is remunerated at the real wage Wt, enters period t with cash holdings Mit, Bit 1 one-period
nominal bonds that pay Rt 1 gross interest (1 + it 1). Moreover, she receives the ow of
dividends from a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers ( it) and a lump sum
transfer from the monetary authority (Tit):
PtCit +Bit +Mit+1 Mit +Rt 1Bit 1 + PtWtNit +  it + Tit; (5)
where  it =
1Z
0
ijtdj .
Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to individual consumption (Cit) and taking the
consumption reference level as external to the ith household returns the following Euler equation:
Et
(
UC (Cit; Xit)jsit
UC (Cit+1; Xit+1)jsit+1
)
= Et

Rt
1 + t+1

; (6)
where
sit =
(
A i¤ Cit  Xit
B otherwise
8t; (7)
is an indicator function according to which the functional form of consumersmarginal utility
depends on their gain-loss prole. The expected marginal rate of substitution between Cit and
Nit reads as:
Nit
UC (Cit; Xit)jsit
=Wt. (8)
15Since the work of Abel (1990), external habit formation has become known as "catching up with the Joneses".
We use the external habit denition in the spirit of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
16The model o¤ers a parsimonious framework to think about risk aversion and loss aversion. Risk aversion
refers to the curvature of consumption utility, which determines the households behavior for large gambles. Loss
aversion refers to the magnitude of marginal utility for losses relative to gains, which determines the households
behavior for small gambles.
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Equations (6) and (8) are paramount to understand how cyclical asymmetries in transmission
of monetary policy may arise in our model. Equation (6) regulates the intertemporal substitu-
tion between current and future consumption. A closer look at this relationship allows us to
provide an intuition on the key mechanism at work in the dynamics of consumption. Households
are more prone to bring consumption forward if they perceive that current and expected future
consumption are both below the reference level (i.e., st = st+1 = B). For st = B the curvature
of the reference-dependent utility function is lower than that observed under st = A, thus imply-
ing a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Consequently, the marginal impact of the
(real) interest rate on current consumption is also higher, relative to the alternative scenario,
which implies that an unforecasted monetary policy innovation will have a greater impact on
current consumption during negative growth cycles. Concurrently, equation (8) governs the
intratemporal substitution between consumption and leisure. For a given jV (C)  V (X)j, the
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption is higher when V (C) < V (X).
Under these circumstances households are more willing to cut on their leisure so as to increase
consumption in the same period, compared to what happens when V (C)  V (X). In a gen-
eral equilibrium perspective, as labor is employed by a monopolistically competitive sector, we
should expect a lower elasticity of rmsreal marginal cost w.r.t. consumption (output). This
translates into an attenuation of the impact of real activity on ination when consumption is
decreasing relative to its reference level, compared to what happens when it expands.
3.2 Supply Side
The nal good is produced by perfectly competitive rms and requires the assembly of a
continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by j 2 [0; 1], via the following technology: Yt =R 1
0 (Yjt)
1  1
 dj
 
 1
. Prot maximization leads to the demand function:
Yjt =

Pjt
Pt
 
Yt 8j; (9)
where Pt =
R 1
0 (Pjt)
1  dj
 1
1 
is the price index consistent with the nal good producer earning
null prots. Total production equals aggregate consumption.
A continuum of rms produce intermediate goods. Each rm employs labor under a
constant-returns-to scale technology:
Yjt = ZtNjt; (10)
where Zt is a log-stationary total factor productivity shifter.
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we assume that rms set prices ac-
cording to a variant of the Calvo (1983) specication. The probability that a rm can re-optimize
its price in each period is 1  !. Firms that cannot re-optimize simply follow a lagged-ination
indexation rule:
Pjt = 
#
t Pjt 1; # 2 [0; 1] : (11)
Optimizing rms maximize their expected stream of future prots, subject to (9) and (10). The
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cost minimization problem is specied as follows:
min
Njt
WtNjt +jt [Yjt   ZtNjt] : (12)
The resulting real marginal cost is RMCt =Wt=Zt.
3.3 The Monetary Authority
The government sets the nominal rate of interest in accordance with a standard instrumental
rule:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
rR t

r Yt
Y
rY 1 rR
exp (t) ; (13)
where t denotes the gross rate of ination and t is a trend-stationary monetary innovation.
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We assume that the government adheres to this rule via open market operations, which are
nanced by means of money transfers to the households, such that any decits are equal to
zero, i.e. Tt = Bt  Rt 1Bt 1.
Assuming a symmetric policy function to stabilize output and ination represents a con-
venient way to close the model at this stage and focus on the e¤ects of introducing reference-
dependent preferences into an otherwise standard framework. In Section 5 we focus on the
monetary policy implications of this modeling assumption and formulate some policy prescrip-
tions that account for the presence of reference-dependent preferences.
3.4 Model Solution
In the framework set out above householdsutility is reference-dependent, i.e. its functional
form depends on whether individual consumption is above or below the reference level (which
is itself determined by aggregate past consumption). Furthermore, we assume that agents do
not actually observe the reference level, Xt, but form beliefs on their relative position. In this
respect, our assumption is similar in spirit to Veronesi (2004), who assumes that consumers
do not observe their stock of habits, but possess a probability distribution on it. Veronesi
(2004) introduces the concept of "beliefs-dependent" utility function (see also Geaneakoplos et
al., 1989; Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Yariv, 2002) in a pure exchange economy, emphasizing the
role of aversion to "state-uncertainty", which naturally arises in this context. In our case we
consider beliefs-dependent preferences with neutrality to state-uncertainty. This allows us to
partial out complications that may arise from aversion to state-uncertainty.
Given the intertemporal nature of householdsmaximization problem, we need to specify
how agentsbeliefs are formed, as these will determine the relevant branch of the reference-
dependent utility function. We assume that agentsbeliefs about their position with respect
to the stock of habits, i.e. on whether they are going to be above or below the reference
consumption level in future periods, evolve as an invariant Markov chain.18 This assumption
17 In the remainder, variables without time subscript denote the steady state value of their indexed counterparts.
18Considering an endogenous mechanism of beliefs switching is likely to alter the way monetary policy is
transmitted and how the Central Bank should respond to smooth uctuations in real activity and prices (see
Davig and Leeper, 2008). Embedding such a mechanism in our model economy is an important development that
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allows us to overcome the endogeneity problem arising from the fact that at any given period
t agents evaluate their utility based on a state-dependent function and have to select a future
consumption plan that depends on their reference consumption level, which is itself determined
in the same period.
Within this setting we can cast the model in the form of a Markov Switching Rational
Expectations (MSRE) model (see Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2008, 2009).19 To this end, we
linearize the key equations in the neighborhood of C=X = 1 and aggregate across individuals,
assuming that in a symmetric equilibrium households make identical consumption-saving deci-
sions.20 Conditional on their relative consumption in each period, consumersbeliefs evolve in
accordance with the following transition matrix:
Q =
"
qAA qAB
qBA qBB
#
; (14)
where qAB = Pr (st+1 = Aj st = B) = 1   qAA and qBA = 1   qBB. Equilibrium dynamics
depends on agentsbeliefs about their relative position with respect to the stock of habits. This
implies that certain parameters can vary depending on the perceived "consumption state". As
agents beliefs evolve in accordance with (14), we have a standard MSRE model and it can
be shown that the Minimal State Variable (MSV) solution is a Markov Switching VAR (see
Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2008, 2009).
Importantly, dealing with reference-dependent habits necessarily implies that the parameters
in the equilibrium system depend on states at time t and t  1. Thus, as in Liu, Waggoner, and
Zha (2009), we need to dene a composite regime that accounts for all possible realizations of
states in t and t  1:
t = fst; st 1g = f(A;A) ; (A;B) ; (B;A) ; (B;B)g : (15)
which implies four states, as reported in extensive form in Appendix A: an expansionary one, a
contractionary one, and two turning points. In the remainder we pose stronger emphasis on the
behavior of the model economy in expansions and contractions. To this end, we will refer to the
expansionary state as that indexed by Et = fA;Ag, while the contractionary one is indicated
we leave for future research. At this stage of the analysis we are mainly interested in showing how the adoption
of reference-dependent preferences in a model of external habit formation allows us to reproduce the asymmetric
reaction of prices and quantities to a monetary innovation.
19 In the quantitative analysis of Section 4.2 the model is solved under the assumption that the representative
agent correctly observes in which regime she is in the current period. Therefore, uncertainty pertains solely to the
states she is going to be in future periods. The dynamics of the model is one where agents weight the behavioral
equations for the probabilities of regarding themselves in any of the "states" of the economy. Therefore, a
measurement equation relates the model to the observables. This can be written as Yt =
P
i } (st = ijIt 1)Yit,
where } (st = ijIt 1) is the probability of being at state i in period t given the information set in the previous
period. This probability is updated recursively based on the Bayes rule (see, e.g., Liu, Waggoner and Zha,
2010). The probability associated with each state can be thought as a set of beliefs that the representative
agent associates with each state at the moment of making her consumption choice, so that the utility function is
e¤ectively beliefs-dependent(see Veronesi, 2004 ).
20The di¤erence between log-variables under sticky prices and their linearized steady state is denoted by lower
case letters. For further details, see Appendix A, where we report the linearized conditions for each of the four
states taken separately. In Appendix B we report the model under the representation used to solve it through
the generalized MSV approach developed by Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2008, 2009), which is based on the
canonical VAR representation of Sims (2002).
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by Ct = fB;Bg.
4 Asymmetries in the Transmission of Monetary Policy
4.1 Some Qualitative Insights
As discussed in Section 3.1, embedding reference-dependent preferences over consumption in
a general equilibrium framework induces two major changes in the key equations describing
the dynamics of real activity and prices: (i) rst, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is
state-dependent, being higher (lower) in contraction (expansion); (ii) second, a state-dependent
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure induces an attenuation of the
impact of real activity on rmspricing behavior during contractions. The rst property has
been widely explored by Yogo (2008). The second property is intimately connected with the
role of reference-dependent preferences in a general equilibrium setting. A globally convex
aggregate supply function can be envisaged in this context, which retains the property to be
steeper (atter) during expansionary (contractionary) episodes. Analogous functional forms
have been explored in the literature on the Phillips curve, emphasizing the role of large shocks
relative to small ones for rmspricing behavior.21 In this respect, the existence of menu costs
can rationalize a convex aggregate supply schedule. Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice how
embedding reference-dependent preferences on consumption in a general equilibrium setting
allows us to provide a microfoundation that emphasizes the role of state-dependent degrees of
real rigidity in the labor market equilibrium allocation, rather than nominal rigidities.
It is useful to explore these intuitions further by inspecting the linearized relationships de-
scribing the behavior of demand and supply across di¤erent states. Specically, we compare the
responses of output and ination to a monetary policy shock when agents "naively" expect the
economy to permanently stay in either expansion or contraction. This amounts to impose, just
for the time being, qAA = qBB = 1. Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) refer to the di¤erence in the
dynamic responses under the model with naive vs. sophisticated consumers as the "expectation
e¤ect." As explained by Davig and Leeper (2007), such expectation e¤ect generally plays an
important role in the presence of autocorrelated disturbances, which is not the case of the mon-
etary policy innovation we envisage. To provide some useful analytical insight we also set  = 0,
which corresponds to a case in which households consider the deviation of their consumption
utility from the utility accruing from a constant consumption reference level. In this case we
implicitly look at cyclical variations in output rather than at expansions/contractions in these
cyclical movements. However, analogous implications carry over to the full model. We also
assume an instrumental rule whereby the Central Bank responds solely to contemporaneous
ination and the output gap (i.e., rR = 0) and no indexation in the pricing process (i.e., # = 0).
21See, e.g., Laxton, Rose, and Tambakis (1999) for a review of the literature and the analysis of the monetary
policy implications of assuming a convex aggregate supply.
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The system of equations describing the model economy reads as:
yt = Etyt+1   (t) (it   Ett+1) ; (16)
t = Ett+1 +  (t) yt    (1 + ) zt; (17)
it = rt + rY yt + t; (18)
where t indexes the state-dependent parameters and  = (1  !) (1  !) (! (1 + #)) 1. The
system (16)-(18) admits the following solution under rational expectations:264 ytt
it
375 = A (t)
"
zt
t
#
; (19)
where A (t) is a state-dependent 3  2 matrix of parameters that determines the marginal
impact of the shocks on the vector of state and control variables. Let us now compare the
response (on impact) of output and ination to the monetary policy shock (t) over expansions
and contractions. As to output:
a12
 
Et

=   1
rY + r ( + 1 + (1  ) ) + 1 + (1  )  ; (20)
a12
 
Ct

=   1
rY + r
 
 + 1  (1  ) 

+ 1  (1  ) 
; (21)
while, for ination:
a22
 
Et

=    ( + 1 + (1  ) )
rY + r ( + 1 + (1  ) ) + 1 + (1  )  ; (22)
a22
 
Ct

=   
 
 + 1  (1  ) 

rY + r
 
 + 1  (1  ) 

+ 1  (1  ) 
: (23)
These results readily provide us with some implications about the response of output and
ination to a monetary innovation across the two states. These are summarized in the following
propositions.
Proposition 1 In the model described by equations (16)-(18) under qAA = qBB = 1 (i.e., naive
agents) the absolute response of output to a monetary innovation is greater under Ct than under
Et . The proof to this proposition is easily obtained by showing thata12  Ct  > a12  Et  ;
which is always true for  >  1. Recall that  > 1 by denition.
Proposition 2 In the model described by equations (16)-(18) under qAA = qBB = 1 (i.e., naive
agents) the absolute response of ination to a monetary innovation is greater under Et than
under Ct if and only if rY > . It can also be shown that the response of ination conditional to
the output gap response in the contractionary state is lower than that appreciated in expansion,
whenever agents display loss-averse preferences. To prove this statement, it is su¢ cient to prove
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that: a22
 
Ct

a12
 
Ct
 <
a22
 
Et

a12
 
Et
 ; (24)
which is always true for  >  1.
First of all, note that imposing  =  1 implies that  () is no longer reference-dependent,
as its functional form is the same regardless of the value of V (C) relative to V (X). Under these
circumstances a12
 
Ct

= a12
 
Et

and a22
 
Ct

= a22
 
Et

. Indeed, the responses of output
and ination are also the same for  = 1, which amounts to ruling out reference-dependent
preferences.
Assuming reference-dependent preferences implies state-dependent degrees of real rigidity
and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption that potentially generate competing
e¤ects on the responses of output and ination following a monetary innovation. Specically, the
IS schedule displays a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution in contractions as compared
to expansions, as (Ct ) > (
E
t ). This result is in line with the analysis of Yogo (2008) and
solely depends on the introduction of loss aversion in householdspreferences (i.e., it holds as
long as  >  1, which is always true, as  > 1 by construction). As to the state-dependent
NKPC, it is straightforward to show that  
 
Ct

<  
 
Et

in Equation (17), meaning that
the elasticity of ination to the output gap is lower in contractions. This inequality is nothing
but (24), which shows that the conditional response of ination to the monetary innovation is
always lower in contractions. However, this may not be enough to generate an attenuation in
the absolute response of ination to a monetary innovation. To see why this is the case note
that in contractions lower real rigidity in the NKPC is counteracted by a greater amplication
in the response of output, as predicted by Proposition 1. Therefore, the overall impact of a
monetary shock on ination depends on the relative magnitude of these competing forces. We
have shown that
a22  Ct  < a22  Et  does not hold unless the systematic policy response
to the output gap (rY ) is strong enough to overcome the amplication e¤ect induced by the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply (). It must be stressed that, should the Central
Bank be a pure ination targeter (i.e., rY = 0), rY >  is never attained. However, it is useful
to note that for rY > 0 this condition is not unlikely to hold, if we consider the values of  that
have generally been calibrated. Recall that  measures the elasticity of the marginal disutility
of labor with respect to hours worked. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) report evidence of low
values of this elasticity, generally between 0.25 and 0.4, while McCallum (2001) suggests values
closer to the lower bound. Kimball and Shapiro (2008) estimate this elasticity to be equal to
1, and stress that such a value is higher than most estimates previously obtained. According
to Eusepi and Preston (2009) the elasticity is about 0.25.22 In Section 4.2 we will see how
considering the probability of switching between regimes as well as the full linearized model
economy allows us to robustly obtain attenuation in ination responses over contractionary
phases of the cycle, despite the amplication of output responses.
To assess the amplication/attenuation e¤ects induced by reference-dependent preferences
22Notice also that  = 0, i.e., linear disutility of labor, would be consistent with the concept of indivisible labor
which implicitly incorporates the extensive margin of labor adjustment in the baseline RBC setting (Hansen, 1985;
Rogerson, 1988).
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on output and ination over di¤erent cyclical phases it is useful to inspect the following ratios,
for di¤erent values of :23
My =
a12
 
Ct

a12
 
Et
 ; M = a22  Ct 
a22
 
Et
 ; Mjy = a22  Ct  =a22  Et 
a12
 
Ct

=a12
 
Et
 : (25)
We set rY = 0:5, r = 1:5,  = 0:5,  = 1,  = 0:09. As to , we consider three
values, namely 0, 0:5 and 1, so as to allow for rY Q  and compare the extent of amplica-
tion/attenuation of ination responses to the policy shock. Figure 4 reports numerical values
for My, M and Mjy. The amplication induced by reference-dependent preferences on out-
put responses in contraction monotonically declines in the level of .24 However, loss aversion
induces substantial amplication of output responses in the contractionary state, with values
of
a12  Ct  that can be from 106% to 44% greater than a12  Et , for  2 [1; 5].
Insert Figure 4 here
As to ination, for  = 0 the attenuation e¤ect experienced in contractionary phases in-
creases in , ranging from 15% to 32% over the same interval for . For  = 1, the multiplier
decreases over the range of values for . Within this interval ination responses are only
slightly greater in contractions, with an amplication that ranges from 18% to 8%. Note that
the absolute magnitude of the amplication/attenuation e¤ect on ination responses for vari-
ous parameter values and di¤erent cyclical phases is much lower compared to that induced on
output responses by loss-aversion. As a result, ination responses to policy innovations during
negative growth cycles are somewhat insulated from the strong amplication in the response of
real activity through reduced real rigidity in the labor market equilibrium. The third panel of
Figure 4 also reports the ratio between the responses of ination in contraction and expansion,
conditional to the output responses. Clearly, as implied by Proposition 2, conditional ination
responses are always substantially stronger in expansion.
4.2 Quantitative Analysis
To quantify the di¤erential impact of monetary policy over contractions and expansions we
compute numerical solutions to the linearized model economy. To this end, we need to assign
some parameter values. We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency. We set  = 0:99
and  = 1. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply () is set to 0:25, while  is
such that steady state consumption equals one. As to the weight of habit formation,  = 0:9.
We do not have any direct empirical reference in the literature on dynamic general equilibrium
models about the parameter indexing the degree of loss-aversion. We set it in accordance with
23 It is also worth pointing out that envisaging di¤erent values of  for a given value of  amounts to impose
di¤erent degrees of diminishing sensitivity above and below the reference level. Specically, 
 
Ct

< 
 
Et

. This
is in line with the strong form of loss aversion of Wakker and Tversky (1993), which implies 
0
( Z) > 0(Z),
8Z > 0. Such an assumption implies that  () is closer to linear for losses than gains, which is in line with
the empirical ndings, and is important to detect amplication/attenuation e¤ects in the linearized economy.
Otherwise, imposing the same  over di¤erent states would not produce major asymmetries once we approximate
the model up to a rst order in the neighborhood of Z = 0.
24To provide an intuition on why this happens it is useful to inspect Figure 3, where the curvature of the
left-hand of  () diminishes in , coming close to zero for high values of this parameter.
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the value suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), i.e.  = 2:25. Nominal rigidity is such
that ! = 0:66 and # = 0:5. As to the policy reaction function, we set rR = 0:7, rY = 0:5 and
r = 1:5. We assume a purely transitory monetary policy shock, with  = 0:02.
As to the transition matrix, Q, we calibrate it in line with the empirical evidence reported
in Section 2. We use the CBO o¢ cial output gap series and compute the average duration
between the bottom of a recession and the top of an expansion. Reverse arguments apply to
compute the average duration of contractionary phases. The probabilities of switching across
states are then retrieved as the inverse of the duration of each phase: qAB = 0:135 and qBA =
0:163; respectively.25 These values translate into a strong persistence of expansionary and
contractionary states, whose probability is captured by the main diagonal elements of Q: a
direct implication is that the analysis pursued in Section 4.1, where qAA = qBB = 1, should not
be qualitatively a¤ected by introducing a non-diagonal transition matrix, at least for a purely
forward-looking economy.
We are now ready to assess the impact of a monetary policy contraction on output and
ination. Figure 5 reports the responses to a monetary policy shock. In each graph, the solid
line corresponds to the model under the expansionary state, while the dashed line refers to the
contractionary one. A note of caution is warranted at this point. The graphs are responses of
the system to a monetary policy shock conditional on other shocks being set at time zero. It
is a convention to report variables in log-deviation from their steady state level. As such, a
contractionary monetary policy shock inevitably implies a negative output response under both
regimes, and not just in the contractionary one. However, in a more general setting we could
envisage a composition of shocks hitting the economy, so that the monetary shock alone is not
enough to inuence the realization of a certain state. Therefore, a rising rate of interest can
cause a contraction in economic activity without this being in contrast with the specication of
the model.
Insert Figure 5 here
It is clear how the response of output is stronger during contractionary phases as opposed to
expansionary ones, a result in line with the analysis of Section 4.1, which conrms the robustness
of the mechanism at work in generating asymmetric responses of real activity between positive
and negative growth cycles. As to the response of ination during contractions, this is insulated
from the higher responsiveness of real activity: overall, we cannot appreciate much di¤erence
in ination responses over di¤erent states.26 The model can qualitatively replicate the evidence
presented in Section 2. The key mechanism works along the lines detailed above. On the
one hand, when consumption is initially believed to lie below its reference level, the sensitivity
of output to changes in the real rate of interest is higher, compared to the case of a perceived
25We also explore the responses to a monetary contraction under the assumption that agents naively believe
that a given state will last forever. These results are available, upon request, from the authors. However, as
explained above, a transitory policy innovation implies no major di¤erence in the dynamic responses under the
model with naive vs. sophisticated consumers.
26This result is robust to alternative values of  relative to rY . For rY >  we commonly observe a weak
attenuation of ination responses to monetary shocks taking place during contractions. Otherwise, we appreciate
no major di¤erence in the response of ination between contractions and expansions for alternative parameteri-
zations.
16
"expanding" consumption path. On the other hand, the response of ination is attenuated when
consumers display loss aversion in consumption, as indicated by the shape of the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure [Eq. (8)] and the resulting state-dependent
NKPC.
5 Implications for Monetary Policy
Once it is recognized that monetary policy exerts an asymmetric impact on output and, to
some extent, ination, it is of obvious importance to explore how the policy maker should
behave to properly account for these facts. To evaluate the policy implications of embedding
reference-dependent preferences into a dynamic general equilibrium context it is useful to think
about a scenario in which the monetary authority acts discretionally and takes the perceived
expansionary and contractionary stages separately.27 This is done for two main reasons. First,
from a practical viewpoint, working under discretion allows us to envisage a sequence of static
optimization problems. In this perspective, the Central Bank does not need to consider the
probability of switching across di¤erent states. Second, from an institutional viewpoint it is
hard to think about a Central Bank that makes any strictly binding commitment on its future
policy action (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999).
We employ a purely forward-looking system. Once again, this amounts to set  = # = 0,
thus allowing for: (i) a gain-loss function in which deviations of consumption from a constant
reference level (X = 1) are weighted; (ii) no indexation in price-setting. In each period the
monetary authority chooses yt and t to maximize
Lt =  1
2

%y2t + 
2
t

+ Ft; (26)
subject to
t = Ett+1 +  (t) yt + ut; (27)
taking Ft =  12Et
P1
i=1 
i

2t+i + %y
2
t+i

as given and where ut is a stationary AR(1) exogenous
cost shifter with autoregressive parameter u.28 This shock is included to account for a mean-
ingful policy trade-o¤ between ination and output stabilization. The solution to this problem
returns the well known relationship:
yt =   (t)
%
t; (28)
which means that whenever ination is above the target the Central Bank should contract output
below capacity (thus implementing a leaning against the wind policy). However, allowing for
loss averse preferences determines state-dependent degrees of real rigidity, captured by  (t),
27 In the setup we envisage the Central Bank does not exert any control on which regime is in place at any given
point in time. In this respect, policy interventions are only "modest" in their scope (see Leeper and Zha, 2003).
By contrast, consumption regimes solely depend on agentsbeliefs, which are assumed to evolve exogenously. As
a direct consequence the architecture of the model economy is substantially insulated from the Lucascritique.
28The welfare criterion expressed in (26) is widely used to capture the stabilization objective of the central
bank over the target variables t and yt. However, under reference-dependent utility we could envisage a state-
depenedent welfare criterion that mimics householdspreferences.
17
that alter the nature of the trade-o¤ between output and ination stabilization depending on
the perceived deviation of consumption from its reference level:
 
 
Et

=  ( + 1 + (1  ) ) ; (29)
 
 
Ct

= 

 + 1  (1  ) 


: (30)
It is evident how, for a given level of above-the-target ination, the Central Bank does not
need to contract output in the contractionary state as much as it should do in the expansionary
one. Recall that in the contractionary state the real interest rate has a much greater impact
on real activity, while inducing only moderate e¤ects on ination. Within this setting we can
derive the optimal state-dependent interest rate rule under discretion:
it = r (t)Ett+1; (31)
where
r
 
Et

= 1 +
 (1  u) ( + 1 + (1  ) )
%u
1+(1 )
; (32)
r
 
Ct

= 1 +
 (1  u)   + 1  (1  ) 
%u
1 (1 ) 

; (33)
and it can be shown that
r
 
Et

> r
 
Ct

: (34)
Therefore, the optimal policy under discretion imposes a higher degree of reactiveness to
the expected rate of ination in the expansionary state as compared to the contractionary one.
A useful way to illustrate the trade-o¤ between ination and output stabilization implied by
the model is to construct the corresponding e¢ cient policy frontier. Combining the IS with the
aggregate supply schedule and the optimal policy under discretion returns the locus of points
that characterize how the unconditional variances of output and ination vary with Central
Bank preferences, as indexed by %. Figure 6 portrays the e¢ cient policy frontiers for the two
alternative scenarios under the calibration considered in the previous section.
Insert Figure 6 here
The graph clearly shows that in the expansionary state monetary policy can reach a pol-
icy frontier which is instead infeasible under the contractionary one. During contractions an
aggressive monetary stance on ination, i.e. a policy that aims at completely o¤setting uc-
tuations in ination incurs into relatively higher costs in terms of output volatility. However,
attaching increasing importance to output volatility gradually leads to similar costs in terms
of ination volatility across di¤erent states. A perhaps more important observation is that de-
creasing output variability by the same amount in contractions and expansions entails a lower
increase in ination volatility in the rst case. This can be readily noticed by picking a point
on both frontiers at the same level of y, thus moving down along each locus so as to attain an
analogous reduction in output variability: the relative increase in , which is measured on the
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x-axis, is greater under expansions than contractions. Therefore, pursuing a decrease in output
variability as a policy objective should be rather done during economic slowdowns, so has to
exploit a lower pass-through from output to ination and trigger lower pressures in terms of
ination volatility, provided that the Central Bank aims at remaining on the policy frontier.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a novel explanation of the vast empirical evidence showing that output and
prices react asymmetrically to monetary policy innovations over contractionary and expansion-
ary phases of the business cycle. We use a piecewise linear VAR to show that monetary policy
has stronger e¤ects on the U.S. GDP during contractions, as compared to expansions. As to
prices, their response is not statistically di¤erent across di¤erent stages of the cycle.
These facts are consistent with a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring external habit
formation in consumption in which we embed reference-dependent preferences: households
utility partly depends on deviations of their consumption from a reference level below which
switching to di¤erent preferences takes place. In line with the theory developed by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) losses in consumption utility loom larger than gains. This implies state-
dependent degrees of real rigidity and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
that generate competing e¤ects on the responses of output and ination following a monetary
innovation. The model is solved by imposing that agents have imperfect observability of the
stock of habits and their relative position with respect to this endogenous reference point. We
also assume that agentsbeliefs evolve as an invariant Markov chain, which allows us to deal
with a Markov Switching Rational Expectations (MSRE) model (see Farmer, Waggoner and
Zha, 2008, 2009). The qualitative and quantitative analyses return predictions that are in
line with the empirical evidence. Output responses to a monetary contraction are greater in
contractions as compared to expansions. Despite the amplication of output responses during
negative growth cycles, ination responses are insulated through lower real rigidity induced
by reference-dependent preferences, so that we cannot detect major di¤erences in ination
responses over di¤erent cyclical phases.
An obvious step is to explore the state-dependent trade-o¤ between ination and output
stabilization that naturally arises in this context. Optimal policy under discretion imposes
a higher degree of reactiveness to the expected rate of ination in the expansionary state as
compared to the contractionary one, the reason being that during contractions an aggressive
monetary stance on ination, i.e. a policy that aims at completely o¤setting uctuations in
ination, incurs into relatively higher costs in terms of output volatility.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst application of reference-dependent preferences
over consumption in a dynamic general equilibrium perspective. This modeling device has
already proven to be a useful extension of the consumption-based asset pricing model (CAPM)
in various studies (e.g., Barberis et al., 2001). Importantly, we show how loss aversion in
consumption utility can also be useful at reconciling the otherwise standard DSGE workhorse
with the widespread evidence on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy over di¤erent stages
of the business cycle.
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It must be stressed that we have focused on a necessarily simplied model in which the mech-
anism of switching between di¤erent states follows an exogenous process.29 Within this setup
we can provide a clear intuition of the key intertemporal and intratemporal mechanisms at work
under reference-dependent utility in a general equilibrium framework, as well as their monetary
policy implications. Allowing for an endogenous mechanism of switching should represent an
interesting extension to this framework. As emphasized by Bernanke (2004), preemptive policy
behavior might have lasting e¤ects on expectation formation and the management of public
beliefs would be a core part of the policy action. In turn, beliefs over the actual and future
monetary policy stance should play an important role in propagating various shocks and induc-
ing varying degrees of persistence in the dynamics of nominal and real variables (see Andolfatto
and Gomme, 2003).
29Currently, computational limitations do not allow us to study the model under a fully endogeneized switching
process. Clearly, imposing exogeneity in the evolution of agentsbeliefs represents a assumption which should be
relaxed in the future, possibly along the lines of Davig and Leeper (2008).
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Figures
Figure 1: NBER recession bands and "contraction" bands derived from the month-to-month
rate of growth of the CBO output gap series.
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Figure 2. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock for expansionary
and contractionary phases of the U.S. business cycle.
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Figure 3. Reference-dependent preferences.
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Figure 5. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock (MS-DSGE model).
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Figure 6. E¢ cient policy frontiers.
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APPENDIX A: Log-linear State-Dependent System.
The IS Curve
We start by reporting the Euler equation consistent with each of the four cases:
Et

Rt
1 + t+1

=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Et

C 1it +(1 )C 1it exp(  lnHit)
C 1it+1+(1 )C 1it+1 exp(  lnHit+1)

i¤ fsit = Ag \ fsit+1 = Ag
Et

C 1it +(1 )C 1it exp(  lnHit)
C 1it+1+(1 )C 1it+1 exp(  lnHit+1)

i¤ fsit = Ag \ fsit+1 = Bg
Et

C 1it +(1 )C 1it exp(  lnHit)
C 1it+1+(1 )C 1it+1 exp(  lnHit+1)

i¤ fsit = Bg \ fsit+1 = Ag
Et

C 1it +(1 )C 1it exp(  lnHit)
C 1it+1+(1 )C 1it+1 exp(  lnHit+1)

i¤ fsit = Bg \ fsit+1 = Bg
;
where Hit = Cit=Xit. After log-linearizing around H = 1 we obtain the following state-
dependent system of linearized IS curves:
yt =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
1+(1 )
1+(1 )(1+)Etyt+1 +
(1 )
1+(1 )(1+)yt 1   it Ett+11+(1 )(1+) i¤ t = fA;Ag
1 (1 ) 

1+(1 )(1  )
Etyt+1 +
(1 )
1+(1 )(1  )
yt 1   it Ett+11+(1 )(1  ) i¤ t = fA;Bg
1+(1 )
1 (1 )( 1 )
Etyt+1   (1 )



1 (1 )( 1 )
yt 1   it Ett+11 (1 )( 1 ) i¤ t = fB;Ag
1 (1 ) 

1 (1 )(1+) 

Etyt+1   (1 )


1 (1 )(1+) 

yt 1   it Ett+11 (1 )(1+) 

i¤ t = fB;Bg
;
where we have aggregated across individuals (imposing homogeneity) and used the goods market
clearing condition, Yt = Ct.
When it comes to linearize the model economy in the neighborhood of C=X = 1, it is
important to note that 
0
(Z) presents an ordinary double point at Z = 0. As such, 
0
(Z) is not
purely di¤erentiable in that point, as also implied by property (i). Therefore, standard linear
approximation techniques such as the Taylor expansion do not immediately apply in this case.
However, we can resort to a rst-order approximation of 
0
(Z) by computing an a¢ ne global
underestimator, thus determining the subgradients of the marginal utility function at Z = 0.
A subgradient determines a support hyperplane to the graph of the function under scrutiny. In
such a case the corresponding subdi¤erential is a direct generalization of the di¤erentiable case.
For a convex and non necessarily di¤erentiable function f : Rn ! R, the subdi¤erential at x0 is
dened as @f (x0) = fg 2 R : f (x)  f (x0) + hg; x  x0ig. Thus, g 2 f (x0) is subgradient in
x0.30 In our case it is straightforward to notice that at Z = 0 there will be a single subgradient
30See Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal (2001).
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for each branch of the function under scrutiny. To gain intuition on this, we can re-write the
marginal utility as 
0
(Z) = min
n

0
A(Z);
0
B(Z)
o
for Z 2 R, where 0A(Z) and 
0
B(Z) are the
functions that encompass the arms of marginal utility corresponding to Z > 0 and Z < 0,
respectively: These functions are both convex. It is also easy to see that 
0
B(Z) > 
0
A(Z) for
Z 2 R+ and 0B(Z) < 
0
A(Z) for Z 2 R . Hence, our approach corresponds to a piece-wise
linear approximation in the neighborhood of Z = 0. Notice also that assuming a smooth gain-
loss function (Z) at Z = 0 allows us to obtain a continuous rst derivative function, which
improves the approximation around the point Z = 0, compared to what would happen, say, with
a linear gain-loss function, which implies a discontinuity at 
0
(0). This is done by constraining
the coe¢ cient in the exponential part of the left-hand branch of the gain loss function to be
= rather than . This assumption also allows us to implicitly consider loss aversion under its
strong formulation, as explained by Wakker and Tversky (1993) and Köbberling and Wakker
(2005), meaning that 
0
( Z) > 0(Z), 8Z > 0.
Ination Dynamics
After applying some trivial algebra we retrieve a log-linearized expression for the real marginal
cost:
rmct =
8><>:
( + 1 + (1  ) ) ct   (1  ) ct 1   (1 + ) zt i¤ st = A
 
 + 1  (1  ) 

ct + (1  ) ct 1   (1 + ) zt otherwise
:
Thus the piece-wise linear NKPC reads as:
t = '
fEtt+1+'
bt 1+
8><>:
( + 1 + (1  ) ) yt   (1  ) yt 1   (1 + ) zt i¤ st = A
 
 + 1  (1  ) 

yt + (1  ) yt 1   (1 + ) zt otherwise
;
where:
'f =

1 + #
;
'b =
#
1 + #
;
 =
(1  !) (1  !)
! (1 + #)
:
APPENDIX B: Setting the Model into the Form of Farmer, Wag-
goner and Zha (2008, 2009).
We now can write the model reported above into canonical form in the following compact form:
A (t)
n1n
xt
n1
= B (t)
n1n
xt 1
n1
+ 	
n1m
"t
m1
;
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where
xt = [yt; t; it; zt; ut; t; Etyt+1; Ett+1]
0
;
is the vector of variables to solve for and ut denotes a log-stationary cost-push shock. Also,
"t = ["
z
t ; "
u
t ; "

t ]
0
;
is a vector of fundamental shocks. The following notation applies:
n = number of all variables for each regime (8),
m = number of fundamental shocks (3),
n1 = number of equations in each regime (4).
After writing the model in the following form we can report the matrices At and Bt
containing parameters that are possibly regime dependent:
yt = 1 (t)Etyt+1 + 2 (t) yt 1   3 (t) (it   Ett+1) ;
t = '
fEtt+1 + '
bt 1 +  1 (t) yt +  2 (t) yt 1   (1 + )zt + ut;
it = rRit 1 + (1  rR) rt + (1  rR) rY yt + t;
where:
1 (t = 1) =
1 + (1  ) 
1 + (1  ) (1 + )  ; 1 (t = 2) =
1  (1  ) 
1 + (1  )   1   ;
1 (t = 3) =
1 + (1  ) 
1  (1  )    1    ; 1 (t = 4) = 1  (1  )


1  (1  ) (1 + ) 
;
2 (t = 1) =
(1  ) 
1 + (1  ) (1 + )  ; 2 (t = 2) =
(1  ) 
1 + (1  )   1   ;
2 (t = 3) =  
(1  ) 
1  (1  )    1    ; 2 (t = 4) =   (1  ) 


1  (1  ) (1 + ) 
;
3 (t = 1) =
1
1 + (1  ) (1 + )  ; 3 (t = 2) =
1
1 + (1  )   1   ;
3 (t = 3) =
1
1  (1  )    1    ; 3 (t = 4) = 11  (1  ) (1 + )  ;
 1 (t = 1) =  1 (t = 2) =  ( + 1 + (1  ) ) ;
 1 (t = 3) =  1 (t = 4) = 

 + 1  (1  ) 


;
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 2 (t = 1) =  2 (t = 2) =   (1  ) ;
 2 (t = 3) =  2 (t = 4) = (1  )


:
Consequently:
A (t)
68
=
26666666664
1 0 3 (t) 0 0 0  1 (t)  3 (t)
  1 (t) 1 0 (1 + )  1 0 0  'f
  (1  rR) rY   (1  rR) r 1 0 0  1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
37777777775
;
B (t)
68
=
26666666664
2 (t) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 2 (t) '
b 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 rR 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 z 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 u 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0  0 0
37777777775
;
	
63
=
26666666664
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
z 0 0
0 u 0
0 0 
37777777775
:
Following Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2008), we can now expand the system under each regime
into an expanded linear system to obtain the MSV solution.
34
